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Abstract
Using the largest household panel survey Understanding Society, this paper investigates low-
income dynamics among pensioner households in the UK controlling for biases due to initial
conditions and non-random survey attrition. Estimation results indicate there is a correlation
between initial and conditional poverty status, speciﬁcally, there is regression towards the
mean. The results ﬁnd no evidence of a correlation between initial poverty status, conditional
poverty status and survey attrition. The ﬁndings show the importance of beneﬁt income in
determining poverty status, suggesting that a dichotomous measure such as poverty status
may not suitably reﬂect actual pensioner living standards. Aside from beneﬁt income, receipt
of employer and occupational pension, health, education and subjective ﬁnancial situation
are important in determining initial and conditional poverty status. Stylised examples
highlight the signiﬁcant differences in the ‘poverty experience’ which arise due to differences
individual and household characteristics.
JEL CODES: D31, J26
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1 Introduction
In the UK a signiﬁcant proportion of the population (1 in 6) is aged 65 and over, in
addition both birth and cohort life expectancy is increasing (ONS, 2014, 2015).1 These
issues are not unique to the UK, but shared by many developed economies and have
led to the number of older individuals (globally) to rise signiﬁcantly over the past 50
years (OECD, 2011). The OECD estimate that the average British female (male) at
state pension age in 2010 should expect to live for an additional 24.5 (16.9) years,
up from 22.7 (15.4) in 1999 (OECD, 2011). Abstracting from important issues such
as health, a report by the Department for Work and Pensions in the United
1 Population estimates are based on 2011 Census data. See: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/
population-estimates-for-uk-england-and-wales-scotland-and-northern-ireland/mid-2014/index.html
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Kingdom estimated 1.8 million pensioners are living in poverty after accounting
for housing costs (DWP, 2014). Therefore understanding pensioner poverty and pen-
sioner living standards within the context of an ageing population in the UK is an im-
portant policy issue; moreover, it also has implications for advanced economies with a
similar welfare system.
The welfare system in the UK provides pensioners on low income with particular
beneﬁts, the main supplementation programme being Pension Credit.2 Expenditure on
Pension Credit is signiﬁcant, in the tax year 2013–2014 £6.233 billion pounds was spent
onGuaranteeCredit which is a speciﬁc subcomponent of PensionCredit available to pen-
sioners on particularly low incomes (DWP, 2015).3 Alongside Pension Credit social
beneﬁt income plays an important role in determining a pensioner’s income position.
Speciﬁcally, pensioners are a group of individuals for whom health-related beneﬁts
such as incapacity, disability, carers/attendance allowance and housing beneﬁt account
for a signiﬁcant proportion of their income. Aside from the signiﬁcant ﬁscal implications
of such beneﬁts; this also implies that when analysing a pensioner’s standard of living
using income-based measures it is important to pay particular attention to their health
and the types of beneﬁt income they are entitled to and report being in receipt of.
The ﬁscal implications of an ageing society highlight the need to understand low-
income dynamics among the pensioner population. Speciﬁcally, how important are
particular factors in determining whether a pensioner enters, transitions out of or per-
sists in poverty? Indeed, how much does income change in retirement? Given the po-
tential sources of income available one might expect an individual’s income to remain
relatively constant in retirement. Research which analyses low-income dynamics also
has implications for policy; for example to quantify the importance occupational pen-
sions on poverty dynamics. However, does a transition out of poverty necessarily
mean an individual’s standard of living has improved? A pensioners standard of living
(in terms of both income and health) is a function of factors accumulated over the life-
course such as work history and health behaviours, and also exogenous shocks such as
disability or the onset of an age-related disease.
Using the largest country-speciﬁc household panel survey Understanding Society this
paper provides the ﬁrst estimates of low-income dynamics among British pensioner
households, which also account for biases which may arise due to initial conditions and
non-random attrition. I investigate the sources which determine poverty status and con-
siderwhether poverty transitions actually correspond to a change in an individual's stand-
ard of living. The ﬁrst-order Markov framework followed in this paper allows me to
explore how differences in individual and household-level characteristics affect the likeli-
hood of entering poverty, poverty persistence and duration in and between poverty spells.
The results imply a high degree of aggregate state dependence for this group of indi-
viduals. The estimation results also suggest that the likelihood of entering poverty,
poverty persistence and duration in and between poverty spells varies signiﬁcantly
2 Pension Credit is available to individuals aged 65 and over. It is made up of two components: Guarantee
Credit and Savings Credit. Guarantee Credit is eligible to pensioners on low income and Savings Credit
is eligible to pensioners who made some private saving towards retirement.
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depending on individual and household-level characteristics. Speciﬁcally, housing ten-
ure, the presence of an occupational/employer pension and disability beneﬁts are par-
ticularly important in determining these quantities of interest. From a methodological
viewpoint the results suggest strong evidence of an initial conditions problem when
analysing poverty transitions among this group. Speciﬁcally, there is a large degree
of mean reversion which is driven by individual investment, pension and social
beneﬁt income. The fact that social beneﬁt income, in particular disability income,
plays an important role in determining poverty transitions highlights the fact that un-
like in conventional studies of poverty dynamics of the working age population, a sim-
ple dichotomous measure such as being poor or non-poor may not necessarily truly
reﬂect a pensioners actual standard of living.4
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on
pensioner income dynamics and modelling individual-level transitions. Section 3
describes Understanding Society, variable deﬁnitions and instruments used for
model identiﬁcation. Section 4 presents the main results and various sensitivity ana-
lyses to check the robustness of my results. Section 5 considers model implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Pensioner poverty and modelling transitions
2.1 Pensioner poverty
Bardasi et al. (2002) using longitudinal data from the 1990s investigate how the onset
of retirement is correlated with becoming poor. Their ﬁndings show that retired indi-
viduals are more likely to be poorer than the rest of the population but that over their
sample period (1991–1997) the incomes of this group actually rose. The authors also
found that retirement was associated with decline in an individual’s economic well-
being. Their analysis highlighted the importance of the period prior to retirement,
in the case of men they found being in full-time employment signiﬁcantly reduced
the likelihood of becoming poor. However, for women labour market history was
not important, but instead living in social housing, not being a member of an occu-
pational pension scheme and retiring before the state pension age all raised the like-
lihood of becoming poor (Bardasi et al., 2002).
Similarly Jenkins and Rigg (2001) investigate the dynamics of poverty in Britain
using longitudinal data from the 1990s. The authors jointly model ﬂows into and
out of poverty and also account for unobserved heterogeneity. Their ﬁndings showed
that households with a pensioner were: (1) more likely to be persistently in poverty
relative to other types of households; (2) more likely to enter or exit poverty due to
changes in non-beneﬁt non-labour income (i.e., pensions); (3) more likely to enter
or exit poverty due to changes in health (the importance of beneﬁt income); and (4)
relative to other household types more likely to experience longer poverty spells.
The authors conclude that income supplementation programmes such as Minimum
4 Moreover, the lack of data relating to disability care costs means it is not possible to calculate an adjusted
income measure which would give a better estimate of an individual’s standard of living. For more in-
formation see Hancock et al. (2015).
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Income Guarantee (the predecessor to Pension Credit) are required to keep these
households out of poverty. The DWP have also analysed low-income dynamics at
older ages as part of their annual Households Below Average Income (HBAI)
publication.5 Their ﬁndings generally mirror those found by Jenkins et al. (2001),
in addition, given the long series of the HBAI publication the general trend from
the analysis has pointed towards a decline in poverty persistence among pensioners;
however, in their most recent publication the DWP have noted pensioner poverty
has started to rise again (DWP, 2015).6 The report also highlighted the relatively
high rate of persistent poverty among single pensioner households and that pensioner
households had relatively low exit rates from poverty compared with other groups.
Brewer et al. (2007) investigate the implications of the 2006 White Paper on pen-
sioner poverty. Their main ﬁnding indicates that pensioner poverty is likely to remain
relatively stable between 2007/8 and 2017/18, principally due to the fact that the UK
government committed to indexing pension credit in line with earnings. However,
their ﬁndings also highlight that relatively low-income pensioner households stand
to lose out due to cuts to the generosity of the Savings Credit component of
Pension Credit. Clark (2001) and Brewer and Emmerson (2003) both investigate
the implications of Pension Credit, a beneﬁt available to individuals when they are
eligible to claim their state pension. The research shows that whilst Pension Credit
helps boost income for the poorest pensioners there are also income and substitution
effects which may affect saving for retirement. In addition, the authors highlight eli-
gible individuals face a relatively high marginal withdrawal rate especially after
accounting for other types of beneﬁts these individuals are entitled to.
The majority of these papers use household surveys to investigate particular aspects
of poverty dynamics at older ages, two potentially important factors have been largely
unaccounted for. The ﬁrst is related to data; the majority of studies which have ana-
lysed pensioner poverty dynamics have used a hazard regression framework. Such
models cannot accommodate left censored data, this raises issues concerning how rep-
resentative the estimation sample is for the purposes of analysis and also drawing pol-
icy implications from such studies. Second, existing studies have not paid particular
attention to survey attrition.7 Speciﬁcally, whether there exists correlated unobserved
factors effecting survey retention and/or low income; accounting for this will eliminate
biases which arise due to non-random attrition. For pensioners, attrition may occur
due to health shocks, a general decline in health due to age or the accumulation of
poor health over the lifecycle; previous studies have emphasised the importance of
controlling for non-random attrition when modelling particular types of transitions
using representative household panel surveys (see inter-alia Jenkins and Rigg, 2001;
Jones et al., 2006; Cuervo and Pudney, 2013). The framework described in Section
3.3 formally accounts for such biases.
5 As of 2010 this publication is no longer produced; the latest version covers the period 2001–2008.
6 Findings are reported based on sample data without accounting for housing costs.
7 A potentially more serious issue is initial non-response (see inter alia Bethlehem et al., 2011; Little and
Rubin, 2014), however ﬁtting a model which accounts for initial conditions, non-random survey attrition
and initial non-response is likely to be very complicated.
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2.2 Modelling individual-level transitions
Jenkins (2011) provides an excellent review of the standard approaches used to model
income dynamics using individual-level microdata. The majority of these approaches
fall into one of six categories: (1) dynamic binary choice (random effects) models, (2)
hazard models, (3) structural models, (4) variance component models, (5) multi-state
models and (6) endogenous switching models.8 I brieﬂy discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of each type of approach and emphasise the reasons why I choose to
model low-income dynamics using an endogenous switching framework.
Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) suggest that the main reason economists use dy-
namic binary choice (random effects) models is to capture state dependence. These
models have the advantage of controlling for initial conditions (Heckman, 1981)
and individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity, factors which the basic transition
model developed by Boskin and Nold (1975) fails to incorporate (Wooldridge,
2005).9 However, Biewen (2009) highlights one notable drawback to dynamic binary
choice models is that they do not allow for feedback effects, namely the framework
assumes the dependent variable in period t− 1 is uncorrelated with covariates in per-
iod t (one recent exception is Ayllón, 2015). This particularly important in the context
of modelling low-income dynamics, previous studies have found strong evidence of
feedback effects (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004; Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009;
Biewen, 2009; Fusco and Islam, 2012).
Hazard or duration models have been widely used to model individual-level dy-
namics (Jenkins, 2011). Jenkins and Rigg (2001), Devicienti (2002) and Bardasi
et al. (2002) use a duration framework to model low-income dynamics using the
British Household Panel Survey. Such models pay particular attention to the amount
of time an individual is in a particular state prior to a transition out of that state;
therefore relative to other approaches individual dynamics are modelled in a sophis-
ticated manner. However, hazard models often assume individual-level unobserved
effects are independent of entry to the initial state and ignore sample attrition
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004).10,11 Another drawback is that hazard models cannot
accommodate left censored observations, this includes individuals who at each wave
of the sample remain in the same state (in the context of this paper being ‘poor’ or
‘non-poor’). This will bias estimates by dropping a large number of observations
and hence make the sample unrepresentative, this bias is compounded by the
fact that hazard models cannot accommodate survey weights which account for
non-random attrition.
8 I do not discuss counter-factual decomposition methods; however for an excellent summary, readers
should consult Aassve et al. (2006).
9 Nonetheless Jenkins and Cappellari (2008) note the model presented in Boskin and Nold (1975) serves as
a useful benchmark and has the advantage of having closed form expressions for estimating durations of
interest assuming variables have reached their steady-state values.
10 A few notable exceptions include Jenkins and Rigg (2001) who jointly model poverty ﬂows and account
for unobserved heterogeneity; see also Stevens (2011) and Devicienti (2002).
11 Unobserved heterogeneity can be incorporated into hazard models (see, e.g., Lancaster, 1990 or Jarvis
and Jenkins, 1997); however this requires making parametric or non-parametric assumptions to summar-
ise the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, a further drawback to this approach is that
survey weights which control for survey attrition cannot be applied to such models.
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Structural models pay particular attention to individual dynamics (for example, la-
bour supply and earnings) whilst also recognising that these factors determine a
households income position (see inter-alia Burgess and Propper, 1998; Aassve
et al., 2006). Using a structural approach Biewen (2009) analyses poverty dynamics
and the role of feedback effects using German longitudinal household panel data.
His ﬁndings indicate the main channels by which the feedback mechanism effects cur-
rent poverty is via an individual’s employment status and their household compos-
ition. Whilst structural models are appealing from a theoretical perspective they are
complex to estimate, require many waves of rich longitudinal survey data and also re-
quire a number of strict assumptions to hold. The strict assumptions relate to the way
the individual ﬁxed effects and general feedback effects operate; however this is un-
likely to be a serious issue for pensioners. This is due to the fact that the main channels
by which these feedback effects affect contemporaneous poverty (via changes in em-
ployment and changes in household composition due to marriage and separation)
are likely to be occuring in low numbers or largely inapplicable to pensioner
households.12 Another drawback of structural and dynamic random effects or ﬁxed
effects approaches is that these estimators require the use of a balanced panel and in
many cases ignore sample attrition.13
Variance component models decompose the permanent and transitory components
of an individual’s income series, the majority of studies using this framework have
applied it to longitudinal US or Canadian data (Jenkins, 2011). One exception is
Blundell and Etheridge (2010) who apply this method to British longitudinal panel
data. The authors show there has been a strong growth in the variance of permanent
and transitory income shocks; and that there has been growth in permanent shocks
to labour income, together these ﬁndings help explain the changes in income inequal-
ity witnessed in the UK between 1980 and 2000. Whilst variance component
models are able to shed light on the components of the income process and how
they change over time, critics have argued such models are sensitive to changes in
model speciﬁcation (Shin and Solon, 2011). These models also rely on observing in-
come at each period and therefore do not control for non-random survey attrition
which may bias results.14 Moreover, variance component models also assume the in-
come process is homogeneous across all individuals, an assumption rejected by
Stevens (2011).15
12 Biewen (2009) interest is in modeling poverty dynamics among working age men; therefore it is not sur-
prising employment and household composition have feedback effects. However, in the case of pensioner
households these factors are likely to play a less signiﬁcant role; for example the rate of unretirement
(deﬁned as a transition from retirement back into paid employment) is relatively low in England (see
Kanabar, 2015) and a change in household composition is most likely to be due to a pensioner losing
their spouse, however in many cases the surviving spouse has access to some or all of their (no deceased)
spouse’s pension and therefore the extent to which a pensioner will experience a large unexpected change
to their income is mitigated. Another example might be sudden changes in health; however these are also
unlikely to affect household income given that free universal healthcare is available in the UK.
13 Although some authors have extended the basic framework and controlled for attrition using longitudin-
al weights, see Biewen (2009).
14 Some studies such as Biewen (2009) have extended the standard variance component framework to in-
corporate longitudinal survey weights.
15 Hazard, random effects and Markov models do not assume a homogeneous income process across all
individuals but allow for this process to differ conditional on poverty status.
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Multi-state frameworks are another class of models which have been used to ana-
lyse changes in household circumstances. Aassve et al. (2006) emphasise the role of
economic behaviour and how optimal decision-making over various dimensions
such as employment, fertility and marital status determine an individual’s overall eco-
nomic position, and hence whether he is in poverty or not. These models are inherent-
ly complex and also do not allow for feedback effects.16 Moreover, the focus of this
paper is to understand low-income dynamics among pensioner households therefore
similar to the argument made against the use of a structural model, it is questionable
whether any of the key decision-making processes highlighted above are likely to be of
relevance or affect the economic position of pensioner households.
Endogenous switching models have been used to study poverty and low pay dy-
namics in the UK (Stewart and Swafﬁeld, 1999; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004,
2008). The endogenous switching model of Cappellari and Jenkins (2004, 2008) con-
trols for the initial conditions problem, left censored data and also survey attrition.
The framework allows for speciﬁc feedback effects by interacting the dependent vari-
able at period t− 1 with covariates (also measured at period t− 1) in determining
their impact on the outcome of interest in period t. This implies one can investigate
the extent of state dependence whilst controlling for individual-level observed and un-
observed heterogeneities. Another advantage of this framework is that it can be ap-
plied to relatively short panels (as a minimum it only requires two waves of data).
However, it is worth noting that there are also drawbacks to this approach; for ex-
ample, Biewen (2009) notes that the structure of the endogenous switching framework
implies that poverty at t− 1 captures all relevant information in determining poverty
at period t. A recent paper by Bhuller et al. (2016) investigating welfare receipt using
administrative Norwegian monthly panel data show that this ‘conditional Markov
property’ fails to hold. Arranz and Canto (2008) also note the importance of retro-
spective data in determining contemporaneous poverty, speciﬁcally an individual’s
poverty history (time spent in and out of poverty). The extent to which this may
cause a bias in estimates is mitigated by the fact that the approach used in this
paper controls for unobserved heterogeneity, as pointed out in a recent paper by
Fusco and Islam (2012). The fact that I use pairs of consecutive waves of data
means I cannot fully exploit the time dimension of the panel and the modelling frame-
work cannot determine the nature and direction of any potential feedback effects.17
Endogenous switching models use covariates at t− 1 to predict poverty at period t:
this rules out accounting for any potential changes between these periods. This may
be important for pensioners, for example being eligible to claim a pension or particu-
lar beneﬁt. In order to address this issue Section 6 describes the components of in-
come, which are attributable to the changes in income and poverty status between
t− 1 and t.
16 An exception here is Biewen (2009).
17 Bhuller et al. (2016) using Norwegian administrative using monthly micro-level data show that the con-
ditional Markov property has implications for the aggregation of a dynamic processes over time. Their
ﬁndings show the estimated state dependence is affected time aggregation bias if the conditional Markov
assumption is violated, nonetheless they ﬁnd even more complex higher-order structures are unable to
satisfactorily account for the true data-generating process.
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2.3 First-order Markov model
The analytical framework used in this paper relies on the endogenous switching
framework developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004). The following exposition
draws heavily on their work.
The outcome of interest, poverty and the transitions to and from this state are mod-
elled between two consecutive years, t− 1 and t. Initial poverty status at t− 1 is deter-
mined by the latent propensity p∗i,t−1:
p
∗
i,t−1 = β′xi,t−1 + εi,t−1, (1)
where i = 1,. . .,N indexes individuals, xt−1 contains information relating to individual i
and the household they live in, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and
εi,t−1N(0, 1) is the sum of an individual-speciﬁc effect ζi, and a white noise error
ιi,t−1.18 An individual is poor if their latent poverty propensity exceeds 0.
The second equation of interest relates to an individual’s survey retention probabil-
ity, formally this deﬁned as whether I observe their household income in period t con-
ditional on having observed it at t− 1. This is modelled by the latent propensity r∗i,t:
r
∗
i,t = γwi,t−1 + κi,t, (2)
where i = 1,. . .,N indexes individuals, wi,t−1 contains many of the same elements also
in the vector xi,t−1, but also some variables which are correlated with the likelihood of
survey retention but uncorrelated with initial poverty and hence excluded from xi,t−1
(these variables or so-called instruments are described in detail in Section 3), ﬁnally γ
is a vector of parameters to be estimated.19 κi,tN(0, 1) is the sum of an individual-
speciﬁc effect ωi and a white noise error εi,t. If an individual’s latent propensity is >
0, then I observe their income in period t, otherwise I do not. If I do not observe
household income in period t then it is neither possible to determine an individual’s
period t poverty status, nor any poverty transition which may have taken place.




i,t = (Pi,t−1)θ′1 + (1− Pi,t−1)θ′2
[ ]
si,t−1 + ϑi,t, (3)
where i = 1,. . .,K indexes individuals (where K <N due to survey attrition), si,t−1 con-
tains variables, which are similar to those contained in xi,t−1 with the exception that
they have been interacted with Pi,t−1.20 Similar to the retention equation the estima-
tion strategy pursued in this paper requires that there must exist variables, which are
correlated with determining initial poverty, but, conditional on this uncorrelated with
poverty transition and so are excluded from equation 3 (these instruments are
described in Section 4.3), ﬁnally θ1, θ2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
ϑi,tN(0, 1) is the sum of an individual-speciﬁc effect τi and a white noise error ςi,t.
18 Any residual is subsumed into the error term and we formally test for correlation between initial poverty,
income retention and poverty transition.
19 In an alternative speciﬁcation of the model I included the instruments used to control for survey retention
in the initial poverty equation and found they were not signiﬁcant.
20 In order to avoid simultaneity between changes in attributes and changes in poverty status we control for
characteristics at t− 1 in equation (3).
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We assume an individual is in poverty in period t if their latent propensity exceeds 0,
similar to equation 2 we can only observe Pi,t if an individual does not attrite from the
survey and we observe their household’s income in period t.21
We estimate the model free of any restrictions and assume the joint distribution of
the error terms is trivariate standard normal. Unobserved heterogeneity can be sum-
marised by the following three correlation coefﬁcients:
ρ1 ; corr(εi,t−1, κi,t) = cov(ζ i,ωi), (4)
ρ2 ; corr(εi,t−1, ϑi,t) = cov(ζ i, τi), (5)
ρ3 ; corr(κi,t, ϑi,t) = cov(ωi, τi). (6)
The cross-equation correlations summarise the unobserved heterogeneity affecting ini-
tial poverty, income retention and poverty transition. As Cappellari and Jenkins
(2004) note the association between unobservable factors, which determine initial
poverty and whether a respondent reports their income in a subsequent wave is cap-
tured by ρ1. If ρ1 > 0 (resp. <0), this indicates that those individuals who are more like-
ly to initially be in poverty at t− 1 are more (resp. less) likely to report their income/
belong to a household which reports their income in the subsequent wave relative to
an individual who is non-poor in t− 1. The correlation ρ2 captures unobserved factors
which determine initial poverty status and poverty transitions (i.e., conditional pov-
erty). If ρ2 > 0 (resp. <0) this implies individuals who have a higher probability of ini-
tially being in poverty in t− 1 are more (resp. less) likely to be in poverty in the
subsequent period relative to individuals who were initially non-poor in t− 1. The
correlation ρ3 captures unobserved factors which determine income retention and con-
ditional poverty status. If ρ3 > 0 (resp. <0), this implies the likelihood of remaining in
poverty is higher (resp. lower) for individuals for whom we observe household income
in t− 1 and t, relative to individuals who are more likely to attrit from the survey
between period t− 1 and t. The model structure imposed by the framework implies
it is possible to formally test for whether initial conditions (ρ = ρ2 = 0) and/or income
retention (ρ1 = ρ3 = 0) are exogenous, these results are reported in Section 5.5.
2.3.1 Poverty transition probabilities
The estimation strategy followed in this paper implies it is possible to analyse three
measures of poverty dynamics: (1) Poverty persistence (mi,t); (2) Poverty entry (li,t);
(3) Poverty exit (ei,t). Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) show that in the context of a
ﬁrst-order endogenous switching model these three statistics are deﬁned as:





21 Jenkins et al. (2006) estimate a ﬁrst-order Markov system with four equations for analysing low-income
dynamics, the extra equation (which we exclude for the purposes of our analysis) is an employment equa-
tion. This latter equation is not applicable for our study given that we condition on individuals in self-
reported retirement, only a tiny proportion (<1%) unretire by the following wave, nonetheless unretire-
ment may be more prevalent over a long-time horizon (Kanabar, 2015). In addition, such an estimation
strategy would require exclusion restrictions, which would imply there existed covariates, which were cor-
related with employment, but uncorrelated with initial poverty status, reporting income and poverty sta-
tus in the next period.
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ei,t ; Pr(Pi,t = 0|Pi,t−1 = 1) = 1− (7), (9)
where Φ2 and Φ1 are the bivariate and univariate cumulative density function of the
standard normal distribution. By explicitly accounting for the retention propensity in
(2) it is possible to estimate transition rates robust to non-random attrition for respon-
dents who were present in period t− 1 but for whatever reason had dropped out at the
survey by t.
Poverty durations: A central measure of interest when analysing poverty dynamics
is the duration an individual spends in or out of poverty. One particular feature of the
ﬁrst-order Markov framework followed in this paper is that it is possible to estimate
such poverty durations, for example the (mean and median) time an individual is
expected to spend in a particular state and the (mean and median) time period be-
tween states (Boskin and Nold, 1975; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004). In Section 5.2,
I present estimates of these quantities of interest using stylised individuals.22
3 Data and deﬁnitions
3.1 Understanding society
The sample used in this study is drawn from Understanding Society (UKHLS), a na-
tionally representative large-scale annual household panel survey which (as a sub-
sample) includes its predecessor the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
Understanding Society is an initiative which is managed by the Institute for Social
and Economic Research based at the University of Essex; for more information see
Knies (2014).
This study pools waves 2–4 of the survey which corresponds to the calendar period
2010–2013.23 I restrict the sample to individuals who (at wave 2) are aged at least 60
if they are female and 65 if they are male and report being in retirement and live in a
household which is deﬁned as a ‘single’ or ‘couple’ pensioner household. After imposing
these sample restrictions and cleaning the data there are 12,904 individuals at t− 1 eli-
gible to be in the sample, of which 1,796 (14%) attrit by t. Table 1 highlights the pattern
between poverty status and survey attrition and also shows the extent of left censored
data in the sample, i.e. individual’s whose poverty status in both t and t+ 1 is identical.
Two notable ﬁndings emerge from Table 1. First, a large proportion of individuals
remain in the same state across two survey waves, for example 58% of individuals re-
main in poverty, whilst nearly 78% are not in poverty in both t− 1 and t. This under-
lines the advantage of using the ﬁrst-order Markov approach when only having a
few waves of survey data: 73% of observations would be dropped if one instead
22 Appendix A states the expressions used to derive the quantities of interest. The estimated durations are
based on the point estimates presented in Tables 4–6.
23 Income data from wave 1 of UKHLS underestimates income from particular types of beneﬁt sources;
however the design of the survey means from wave 2 onwards survey techniques such as dependent inter-
viewing and panel conditioning mean a more accurate measure of individual (and therefore household)
income is recorded. For more information see Fisher (2015).
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opted to use a hazard approach, which cannot accommodate left censored data.
Second, the difference in the attrition rate between individuals who are initially
non-poor versus those who are poor appears to be small. The main reason individual’s
attrited from the sample is due to outright refusal (4%) and death (1.4%).
A key concept in this paper is the deﬁnition of poverty. I use an income-based
measure. This is based on information reported by survey respondents at the time
of the interview and is composed of all sources of labour income, miscellaneous in-
come, private beneﬁt income, investment income, pension income and social beneﬁt
income. Each wave of Understanding Society data contains a derived household
net income variable, this variable sums all individual incomes within the household
having taken account of any taxes and (claimed) beneﬁts individuals are liable for
or entitled to.24 From this ﬁgure housing costs which may consist of rent, water
rates, community water charges and council water charges, mortgage interest pay-
ments, ground rent and service charges and council tax are deducted.25 The British
DWP the government department responsible for state pensions and reducing pen-
sioner poverty refer to this as poverty After Housing Costs (AHC) and it is their pre-
ferred measure when analysing low-income dynamics among pensioner households.
The reason for this is that: (1) a high proportion of pensioners own their own
home outright; (2) in deriving poverty thresholds one should account for differences
in housing costs relative to working-age households; (3) to account for interest rates;
and (4) to account for increases in rent (DWP, 2015).
Having created a measure of poverty AHC, I follow the DWP and Ofﬁce for
National Statistics (ONS) and deﬁne an individual as being in poverty if he/she
belongs to a household whose income is below 60% of real median equivalised net
household income.26,27 The real monthly net equivalised income which deﬁnes the
Table 1. Poverty status and attrition
T
t− 1 Non-poor Poor Missing Total
Non-poor 77.99% (7,377) 8.18% (774) 13.83% (1,308) 100% (9,459)
Poor 27.08% (939) 58.75% (2,024) 14.17% (482) 100% (3,445)
Total 64.40% (8,310) 21.68% (2,798) 13.92% (1,796) 100% (12,904)
Notes : Sample is based on UKHLS waves 2–4. Author’s calculations, for more information see
text.
24 For more information regarding the derivation of the net income variable see Knies (2014).
25 Understanding Society asks respondents for a composite measure of rent and ﬂags whether this includes
water rates. For respondents whose rent does not include water rates it is not possible to deduct this from
their net income; however water rates are likely to constitute only a small proportion of total housing
costs.
26 I adjust household size using the OECD equivalence scale. For the purpose of estimating the poverty line
at each wave the entire Understanding Society sample is used (the data are weighted to account for sur-
vey design and to ensure it is representative of the UK population).
27 As a robustness check I re-estimated the model using a poverty threshold based on the real net income
Before Housing Costs; the headline ﬁndings are very similar to those reported AHC.
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AHC poverty threshold for 2010, 2011 and 2012 was £650, £667.78 and £662.13, re-
spectively (2005 prices).
3.2 Variables
Understanding Society contains a wide range of economic and sociodemographic
variables, which are available at every wave of the survey.28 In keeping with previous
studies of poverty the majority of covariates are deﬁned at the level of Head of
Household (HoH). The HoH is deﬁned as the individual within the household who
contributes the greatest share of household income. Understanding Society provides
the fraction of household income attributable to each person living in the
household.29
Health has been shown to be an important characteristic determining the standard
of living in older age (Banks and smith 2006; Jones et al., 2010). I control for self-
reported health which is recorded on a ﬁve-point scale and whether an individual
has a health limitation or disability, I also interact these two controls to determine
their joint effect. Understanding Society asks sample respondents whether they
have caring responsibilities for another household member, this is likely to affect
an individual’s ability to work or constrain the number of hours they can work.
Part of the cost may be offset if the individual is entitled to attendance or carer’s
allowance to help with care. I separately control for whether an individual is in receipt
of particular disability beneﬁts including: incapacity/severe disablement (including
industrial injury/sickness accident) and carer’s or attendance allowance.
Bozio et al. (2011) using administrative linked data show educational attainment
and pension type are important in determining an individual’s economic position in
retirement. I include a control for highest level of educational attainment (ﬁve-point
scale) and the type and number of pensions an individual is in receipt of.30 Related
to pension receipt, Stewart (2003) using the BHPS highlights the importance of an
individual’s earnings history in determining their income and wealth position in retire-
ment. At the time of writing retrospective employment history data for Understanding
Society sample respondents is unavailable; however, I control for the type and number
of pensions an individual is receiving income from and this is likely to be strongly cor-
related with their labour market history. Understanding Society also asks sample
respondents to report their income sources; I control for whether an individual is in
receipt of investment income, private beneﬁt income and miscellaneous income.
28 One limitation of Understanding Society is that it does not contain data on pension wealth; although for
the majority of the sample this is likely to have been annuitised and become part of individual (and thus
household) income.
29 In cases where the contribution to household income in a two person pensioner household is identical
then whoever is oldest is deﬁned as the HOH; if this is also identical then in these very few cases the
male is assumed HoH.
30 Bozio et al. (2011) use National Insurance contribution histories linked to the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing to investigate the heterogeneity in pension wealth holdings. Whilst Understanding
Society does not contain data on pension wealth the fact this study is based on individuals in retirement
who are at or above state pension age implies that such individuals will already be drawing down on their
pension wealth and using it as a source of income (which is used to deﬁne whether they are in poverty).
Ricky Kanabar12
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474747216000135
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Essex, on 27 Oct 2016 at 13:05:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Marital status is another characteristic which has been shown to inﬂuence house-
hold income in retirement. Jenkins and Rigg (2001) using the BHPS found that
over a four-wave window 55% of single pensioner households experienced poverty
at least once, whilst the equivalent ﬁgure for pensioner couples was lower at 38%.
Jarvis and Jenkins (1997) also using the BHPS ﬁnd 1/3 of male and 1/2 of female sin-
gle pensioner households are likely to experience persistent poverty.
Similarly, housing tenure has been shown to be an important determinant of an
individual’s standard of living in retirement (Bardasi et al., 2002; Disney et al.,
2002). Speciﬁcally, housing costs effect an individual’s ﬁnancial resources available
for consumption, ceteris paribus a homeowner will have a higher level of disposable
income (after accounting for housing costs) relative to an individual who has a mort-
gage or rents (Campbell and Cocco, 2007). Homeowners also have a higher stock of
wealth and are able to release equity through downsizing or taking an additional
mortgage, therefore this group of individuals is likely to be less credit constrained rela-
tive to households who still have an outstanding mortgage, are in social housing or
renting. However, it is important to note that poor non-homeowner pensioners
may be in receipt of particular beneﬁts which boost their individual/household
income.
I also control for an individual’s subjective ﬁnancial situation at the time of the sur-
vey interview, which is likely to be related to their poverty status. Stewart (2009) uses
such a measure to derive a pensioner equivalence scale using longitudinal British
panel data, his ﬁndings suggest that the current equivalence scale used by the state is
more generous than that implied using his constructed scale using subjective ﬁnancial
expectations data. Finally, Brewer et al. (2007) show there exists signiﬁcant variation
over time in household income by Government Ofﬁce Regions in the UK. Therefore
I control for the government ofﬁce region in which a household resided in.
3.3 Model identiﬁcation
In order to model dynamics one must ﬁrst observe an individual’s initial income pos-
ition; however, this is unlikely to be random. Indeed many studies have highlighted
the signiﬁcant differences in individual’s ﬁnancial position on reaching retirement
(see inter-alia Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Kapteyn et al., 2005; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2007). Bozio et al. (2011) highlight the importance of state and private pen-
sion contributions (from lifetime earnings) in determining retirement income. Their
results suggest that differences in retirement income are largely due to marital status
and individual’s numerical proﬁciency. Therefore it is important to account for indi-
vidual heterogeneity when modelling low-income dynamics, this is often referred to as
the initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981). Ignoring the initial conditions prob-
lem in the context of low-income dynamics using survey data will lead to a bias in
model estimates and implied durations of interest (Jenkins, 2011).
For the purposes of model identiﬁcation and to eliminate such biases, I must as-
sume particular exclusion restrictions. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) highlight that
for the modelling strategy to be successful one needs an instrument which is correlated
with initial poverty at t− 1 but conditional on this is uncorrelated with poverty status
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at t. Heckman (1981) suggests that one should use information prior to an individual’s
own labour market entry. Therefore I utilise data on respondent’s paternal level of
educational attainment. One could also use information collected about maternal
level of educational attainment; however, this did not satisfy the conditions for
being a satisfactory instrument. This covariate had low power in determining initial
poverty equation at t− 1, this is related to the fact that there is little variation in
the level of maternal educational attainment for the sample of individuals used in
this paper. Paternal educational attainment is coded as a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 if a sample respondent’s father left full-time education with a qua-
liﬁcation or a degree and 0 otherwise. A priori (and holding all else constant) one
would expect individuals who grew in up in a household with a more highly educated
father to be less likely to experience poverty during their lifetime including when in
retirement; indeed a large body of evidence has shown there exists positive interge-
nerational earnings mobility and a positive correlation between parent’s and chil-
dren’s earnings (see inter-alia Behrman and Taubman, 1990; Grawe, 2006; Nicoletti
and Ermisch, 2008). Table 3 in Section 3.4.1 shows that 16% of non-poor households
had a HoH whose father left education with a recognised qualiﬁcation or degree,
whilst this ﬁgure stood at only 13% in poor households. In Section 5.5.1, I describe
various tests to ensure the validity of paternal educational as an instrument to deal
with the initial conditions problem.
A second instrument is required to control for non-random attrition. The instru-
ment should be correlated with sample retention status but conditional on this be
uncorrelated with poverty status at t. Understanding Society contains data collected
by the ﬁeldwork interviewer, which characterises certain aspects of the survey
interview.31 Speciﬁcally, Understanding Society collects data on whether during the
survey interview a survey respondent mentions:
1. Purpose of the survey (e.g., what’s the purpose? what’s all this about?)
2. Interview length (e.g., how long will this take?)
3. Panel design (e.g., you’ll be coming back next year?)
4. Conﬁdentiality (e.g., who is going to see the answers?)
5. Incentive/payment (e.g., what’s in it for me/us?)
6. Other query.
Using this information I generate a variable which summarises the number of positive
responses in relation to the six queries above. This variable can take one of three
values; the variable is equal to zero if the survey respondent did not raise any of
the issues, it is equal to one if they respond ‘yes’ to at most one of the issues and is
equal to two if the survey respondent raises two or more issues. One would expect
that the more issues raised by the survey respondent, the less likely they are to be pre-
sent in the next wave of the survey. Similar to the instrument used to control for initial
conditions I test the validity of the retention instrument in Section 5.5.1.
31 This information is collected at the household level and is answered by one individual in the household (if
living in a two person household).
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Table 2 highlights the extent to which individuals raise such queries at the time of
their interview conditional on their poverty status at t− 1. The estimation strategy
requires pooling waves of the survey and implies I have repeated observations of
the same individual and household. Therefore the results in Table 2 describe the char-
acteristics for only the ﬁrst two-wave panel, i.e. t− 1 in Table 2 refers to wave 2 or the
calendar year 2010/2011.32
Table 2 indicates approximately 20% of non-poor and poor households raise at
least one query relating to the survey. Table 2 also indicates conditional on initial pov-
erty status there are statistical differences in the mean proportion of queries raised. A
priori there is no clear pattern or relationship one would expect between poverty
status and retention probability; except perhaps that poor households might be more
interested in receiving a ﬁnancial incentive for taking part in the survey. The results
from Table 2 indicate that a slightly higher proportion of this group does ask more
queries in general and that this effect is statistically signiﬁcant for >1 query. In terms
of ﬁnancial incentives, for this sample only a very low proportion of households raised
this query (1% and 1.5% of non-poor and poor households, respectively).33
3.4 Descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Characteristics
Table 3 shows the mean value of each individual characteristic used in the model con-
ditional on an individual’s poverty status at t− 1. The sample has been restricted to
individuals in the ﬁrst two-wave consecutive panel, i.e. t− 1 in Table 3 refers to wave
2 or the calendar year 2010/2011.34
Table 3 indicates that there are signiﬁcant differences in the observable economic
and sociodemographic characteristics of individuals, conditional on their poverty sta-
tus. In non-poor households, a higher proportion of individuals are younger, male
and married. These individuals live in households where a higher proportion of
HoHs hold a degree, have two or more non-state pensions, have income from sources
other than their pension, self-report a higher level of health and report a higher level
Table 2. Sample respondent queries regarding survey by initial poverty status
Poverty statust− 1 Raised no queriest− 1 Raised 1 queryt− 1 Raised >1 queryt− 1
Poort− 1 77.7% 16.9% 5.2%
Non-poort− 1 81%*** 15.4% 3.5%***
Notes : Proportions may add up to more than 1 due to rounding. Statistical differences deter-
mined using an independent sample t-test assuming unequal variances (by poverty status).
Null hypothesis assumes there is no difference between groups. *, **, *** indicate test results
that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
32 The results for the waves 3 and 4 panel are very similar.
33 The difference between these two is not signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
34 The individual characteristics for the pair of waves 3–4 are very similar.
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Table 3. Comparison of individual and household characteristics at wave 2 by poverty
status









Father had a qualiﬁcation or degree 0.13 0.16***
Age 76 74***
Degree 0.03 0.14***
Higher degree 0.05 0.12***
A-level 0.11 0.14***
GCSE 0.12 0.12
Other qualiﬁcation 0.19 0.15***
No qualiﬁcation 0.50 0.32***
Male 0.50 0.65***
Owns home outright 0.79 0.73***
Owns home with mortgage 0.04 0.04
Local authority housing 0.08 0.11***
Housing association 0.05 0.08***
Renting 0.05 0.04***
Excellent health 0.03 0.07**
Very good health 0.22 0.25***
Good health 0.30 0.28**
Fair health 0.30 0.25***
Poor health 0.11 0.15***
Longstanding illness/disability 0.40 0.37***
Excellent health and limiting illness/disability 0.01 0.02
Very good health and limiting illness/disability 0.08 0.09
Good health and limiting illness/disability 0.16 0.17
Fair health and limiting illness/disability 0.24 0.21***
Poor health and limiting illness/disability 0.11 0.15***
Not in receipt of disability income beneﬁt 0.91 0.75***
In receipt of Incapacity/severe disablement beneﬁt 0.05 0.14***
In receipt of attendance or carers allowance 0.04 0.11***
Cares for someone in household 0.04 0.07***
N 1,939 5,136
HoH characteristicst− 1
Lives in North East or West 0.23 0.22
Lives in East or West Midlands 0.18 0.14***
Lives in London and South East 0.15 0.19***
Lives in East of England 0.07 0.09**
Lives in South West and Wales 0.18 0.19
Lives in Scotland 0.08 0.10**
Lives in Northern Ireland 0.09 0.07***
Financial situation: living comfortably 0.26 0.44***
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of satisfaction with their current ﬁnancial status compared with individuals who
are poor. Table 3 also shows that in non-poor households a higher proportion of
HoHs had a father who held a formal qualiﬁcation or degree.
Social beneﬁt income has a strong impact on pensioner’s income, particularly if indivi-
duals have some formof physical ormental disability. Individuals are entitled to carers or
attendance allowance if they are physically or mentally disabled and require assistance
with care. Therefore it is not surprising that a higher proportion of individuals in non-
poor households have a HoH who has caring responsibilities. Similarly individuals who
have a mental or physical disability are entitled to various beneﬁts to help support them;
hence it is not surprising to ﬁnd a higher proportion of non-poor individuals who report
having a limiting illness or disability and are in receipt of disability beneﬁts. The fact
that I do not control for the costs associated with such disabilities or illnesses implies I
may be underestimating the true level of poverty among pensioners, and therefore also
masking the standard of living experienced by this group of individuals.
Finally, there are differences in housing tenure conditional on poverty status; the
proportion of HoHs who report living in local authority housing or in a housing as-
sociation is higher among those living in non-poor households; however, this is likely
to be related to receiving housing beneﬁt. For example, 69% (36%) of non-poor (poor)
individuals who report living in local authority housing or in a housing association
are in receipt of housing beneﬁt, highlighting the signiﬁcant inﬂuence that state ben-
eﬁts can have on determining the income position of pensioners.
3.5 Pensioner income, income mobility and an individual’s standard of living
Prior to analysing low-income dynamics among pensioners it worth considering how
this group of individuals is spread across the entire income distribution, that way it is
Table 3 (cont.)
Poort− 1 Non-poort− 1
Financial situation: Doing alright 0.35 0.32*
Financial situation: Just about getting by 0.34 0.21***
Financial situation: Finding it quite difﬁcult 0.03 0.02***
Financial situation: Finding it very difﬁcult 0.01 0.01
State pension (& pension credit) or no pensions 0.34 0.19***
One non-state pension 0.58 0.63***
Two or more non-state pensions 0.08 0.17***
No sources of non-pension income 0.52 0.44***
Investment income 0.46 0.54***
Private beneﬁt income and misc. income 0.006 0.007
Investment, private beneﬁt and misc. income 0.004 0.01***
N 1,939 5,136
Notes : Proportions may add up to more than 1 due to rounding. Statistical differences deter-
mined using an independent sample t-test assuming unequal variances. Null hypothesis assumes
there is no difference between groups. *, **, *** indicate test results that are signiﬁcant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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possible to interpret the estimation results in a wider context. Figure 1 depicts a scat-
terplot of equivalised real pensioner household income pairs for each individual in the
wave 2–3 sample.
Each of the black lines deﬁnes the threshold which corresponds to the AHC quintile
position in the relevant wave-income distribution, for example an individual is in the
bottom quintile of the AHC income distribution at wave 2 if their equivalised house-
hold income is below £693 (2005 prices).35 From Figure 1 it is clear a large proportion
of individuals are in the middle–lower end of the AHC income distribution irrespect-
ive of survey wave. For example, at wave 2 (3) 59% (58%) of pensioners were classiﬁed
as being in the bottom 2 quintiles of the AHC income distribution.36
The data in Figure 2 are identical to Figure 1; however instead of income quintiles, it
compares income pairs relative to theAHCpoverty threshold at eachwave. The 45° line
corresponds to the case where there is no income mobility between the survey waves.
Figure 2 highlights that a signiﬁcant proportion of the sample persists in poverty
across both survey waves; however, there is also individuals who experience signiﬁcant
changes in their income position, represented by circles above and below the 45° line.
Pensioners both exit and enter poverty each year; for example among pensioners
whose income is observed at waves 2 and 3: 10.10% enter poverty and 31.75% exit
Figure 1. (colour online) Quintile income position among pensioners in
waves 2 and 3.
Notes : Income refers to monthly household net equivalised income which
has been adjusted to account for inﬂation (2005 prices).
35 Using a representative household panel survey such as Understanding Society means it is possible to ac-
count for the survey design and use the full sample to generate poverty thresholds and quintile position in
the income distribution. This is undertaken using the svy suite of commands in Stata.
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poverty. The large differences are due to the fact that the initial pool of non-poor pen-
sioners is far bigger than the pool of initially poor pensioners.
However, does escaping poverty correspond to an improvement in an individual’s
standard of living? We have already seen that state beneﬁts, in particular disability
related beneﬁts, can heavily inﬂuence the income position of a pensioner. For example,
an increase in incomemay be due to becoming disabled and claiming particular beneﬁts
which boost income; but undoubtedlymean an individual’s standard of living is likely to
have decreased without even accounting for the higher care costs incurred. Section 5
explores the changes in the sources of individual-level income among pensioners (by
poverty status) in order to understand what is driving the changes reﬂected in Figures
1 and 2. Jenkins (2011) shows a similar pattern exists for working age households, a
priori one may have expected less volatility in incomes across a single survey-wave
among pensioner households given their lifestage and relatively stable income sources;
this underlines the importance of understanding the factors driving such dynamics.
4 Estimation results and sensitivity analysis
4.1 Estimation
Estimation is carried out using the STATA™ commands mdraws and mvnp (for more
information see Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003, 2006).37 Probabilities from the trivari-
ate standard normal distribution function are derived using simulation methods based
Figure 2. (colour online) Scatterplot of waves 2 and 3 income versus poverty
threshold.
Notes : Income refers to monthly household net equivalised income which has
been adjusted to account for inﬂation (2005 prices).
37 The model requires the use of the STATA™ code in Section 3.5 of Cappellari and Jenkins (2006).
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on the GHK simulator (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1997) with antithetic Halton draws
(200 per equation).38 The estimation strategy requires pooling multiple waves of sur-
vey data. This implies our sample consists of repeated observations on the same indi-
vidual and therefore the IID assumption is violated. I follow Cappellari and Jenkins
(2004) and adjust standard errors using a robust variance estimator by clustering indi-
viduals to households to which they belonged in at the ﬁrst wave of observation. This
so-called robust variance estimator allows for arbitrary correlations between observa-
tions within the same sample cluster whilst assuming independence across clusters
(Jenkins, 2011, 341). In practice, the estimation of equations (1)–(3) is carried out sim-
ultaneously however for the purpose of exposition I discuss each equation in turn and
then go on to discuss the cross equation correlations.
4.2 Initial poverty status
Table 4 describes the impact of individual and HoH characteristics on determining
initial poverty status. The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability
of being in poverty relative to the reference individual. The reference individual is
deﬁned as an individual whose own age and their HoH’s age is equal to the median
values in the sample (73 and 74, respectively). In the case of categorical or dummy
variables, the marginal effect is calculated as a unit change in a particular character-
istic whilst setting all other characteristics equal to zero. For continuous variables (age
and HoH age) the marginal effect is calculated as a change from the median to the
75th percentile in the relevant age distribution.
Table 4 shows that being a female pensioner raises the probability of being poor, for
example at t− 1 (wave 2) the median monthly income among male and female single
person households was £837 and £766 respectively. This effect is stronger at the indi-
vidual level rather than the HoH level, however, both characteristics are statistically
signiﬁcant. This is likely to be partly driven by the signiﬁcant proportion of single pen-
sioner households in the sample. Further, given the cohort(s) of individuals in the
sample it is likely the labour market participation histories of male and female sample
respondents is different (with males having stronger labour force attachment), even
after accounting for the fact that certain pensions schemes entitle widow’s some frac-
tion of their deceased spouse’s pension.
Similarly marital status also inﬂuences initial poverty status, relative to having been
single and never married an individual who self-reports themselves as being married is
6.6 percentage points less likely to be in poverty holding all else constant. This result is
intuitive and reﬂected in the OECD equivalence scale, couples can exploit economies
of scale in (for example) consumption and energy costs. On the other hand, indivi-
duals who have divorced or separated are 5.1 percentage points more likely to be
in poverty holding all else constant, however, this effect is only signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
38 Halton draws have been shown to have good multidimensional coverage properties (Train, 2009;
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). I drop the ﬁrst ten initial sequence elements for each equation which is
greater than the highest prime number (5) used to generate the sequences.
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Table 4. Model estimates of initial poverty status
Variable M.E. Coefﬁcient (S.E.)
Individual
Age −0.0039 −0.00004 (0.007)
Male −0.019*** −0.07 (0.028)
Married −0.068*** −0.27 (0.07)
Divorced 0.034* 0.17 (0.078)
Widowed 0.0009 0.03 (0.067)
HoH
Father educated −0.026** −0.148 (0.05)
Age 0.020** −0.02 (0.007)
Male −0.016 −0.12 (0.05)
Other higher degree 0.07 0.29 (0.09)
A-level 0.24*** 0.76 (0.08)
GCSE 0.26*** 0.84 (0.08)
Other qualiﬁcation 0.263*** 0.93 (0.08)
No qualiﬁcation 0.30*** 0.94 (0.08)
Owns home with mortgage −0.048*** −0.18 (0.09)
Local authority housing −0.13*** −0.89 (0.06)
Housing association −0.14*** −0.92 (0.07)
Renting −0.05*** −0.21 (0.08)
Health: Very good 0.04* 0.14 (0.08)
Health: Good 0.037 0.13 (0.08)
Health: Fair 0.09*** 0.29 (0.10)
Health: Poor 0.01 0.04 (0.23)
Longstanding illness/disability 0.04*** 0.15 (0.04)
Very good health and limiting illness/disability −0.039 −0.15 (0.16)
Good health and limiting illness/disability −0.04 −0.15 (0.15)
Fair health and limiting illness/disability −0.05 −0.18 (0.16)
Poor health and limiting illness/disability −0.025 −0.08 (0.26)
In receipt of Incapacity/severe disablement beneﬁt −0.157*** −0.86 (0.07)
In receipt of attendance or carers allowance −0.165*** −0.95 (0.07)
East and West Midlands 0.02 0.08 (0.07)
London and South East −0.03* −0.11 (0.07)
East of England −0.01 −0.06 (0.07)
South West and Wales −0.02 −0.07 (0.06)
Scotland −0.02 −0.08 (0.07)
Northern Ireland −0.08*** −0.36 (0.08)
FS: ‘Doing alright’ 0.01*** 0.35 (0.04)
FS: ‘Just about getting by’ 0.19*** 0.57 (0.05)
FS: ‘Finding it quite difﬁcult’ 0.18*** 0.55 (0.10)
FS: ‘Finding it very difﬁcult’ 0.30*** 0.84 (0.16)
1 Employer/occupational pension −0.11*** −0.48 (0.04)
>1 Employer/occupational pension −0.16*** −0.93 (0.06)
Investment income 0.017 0.063 (0.039)
Private beneﬁt income and misc. income −0.09 −0.38 (0.133)
Investment, private beneﬁt and misc. income −0.10 −0.45 (0.131)
Cares for another in household −0.068*** −0.27 (0.09)
Data from wave 2–3 block 0.007 0.03 (0.02)
Intercept N/A −2.07 (0.24)
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Educational attainment plays an important role in determining initial poverty sta-
tus. Table 4 indicates that relative to university degree holders all other groups are
signiﬁcantly more likely to be in poverty. The magnitude of the marginal effect is
large and monotonically increases the lower the level of educational attainment
attained; for example having no qualiﬁcations increases the likelihood of being
poor in t− 1 by 30 percentage points holding all else constant.
Table 4 shows that the HoH’s father’s educational attainment also plays an import-
ant role in determining the likelihood of being in poverty. The marginal effect of hav-
ing a father who left school with a recognisable qualiﬁcation or degree reduces the
probability of an individual being in poverty by 3.4 percentage points. This result indi-
cates that paternal educational attainment is ‘relevant’ in a statistical sense and
satisﬁes one of the conditions for being a suitable instrument to control for initial con-
ditions; a body of research has shown parent’s educational attainment is important in
explaining the correlation in the intergenerational transmission of earnings and wealth
(see inter-alia Shin and Solon, 2011). A raw tabulation based on the sample data indi-
cates that 23% of HoH’s whose father left school with a recognised qualiﬁcation or
degree had a degree themselves (which has been shown to be important in determining
initial poverty status); whereas for HoH’s whose father left school with no recognis-
able qualiﬁcation this ﬁgure is only 9.7%.
Table 4 highlights the importance of having an occupational or employer pension
compared with relying solely on state pension income alone.39 Unsurprisingly, the
level of savings made for retirement has been found to be an important determinant
of retirement living standards (Crawford and O’Dea, 2014). The marginal effect of
having one occupational or employer pension reduces the probability of being in ini-
tial poverty by 11 percentage points. Similarly having two or more occupational or
employer pensions reduces the probability being in initial poverty, the magnitude of
this effect is approximately 1.6 times that of having one occupational/employer pen-
sion. The introduction of auto-enrolment in to a workplace pension in 2012 is ex-
ample of how to increase provisions for retirement, however such a policy will not
Table 4 (cont.)




Notes : Base groups are degree, owns home outright, Health: excellent, North East and West of
England, Financial situation: living comfortably, State pension and/or Pension Credit, No dis-
ability beneﬁts, No non-pension income sources. *, **, *** indicate coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
39 The base group also includes individuals who report being in receipt of state pension and pension credit
only and also a very small proportion of the sample who reported that they were not in receipt of any of
the types of pensions asked mentioned in the survey; however a high proportion (>50%) of this group
were in poverty in t− 1.
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address pensioner poverty among current retirees or among individuals close to retire-
ment age.
Beneﬁt income is another important source of income for pensioners. Pensioners
may be entitled to disability or incapacity beneﬁt (although both are being replaced
with Employment Support Allowance), in order to be eligible an individual must suf-
fer from a particular physical or mental impairment and this may be formally veriﬁed
in order to determine the level of support and beneﬁt entitlement. An individual who
lives in a household where the HoH reports being in receipt of this beneﬁt is 15.7 per-
centage points less likely to be poverty, highlighting the signiﬁcant impact such a
beneﬁt can have on determining an individual’s income position. Another type of
beneﬁt which can impact a pensioner’s income is carers or attendance allowance.
An individual who lives in a household where the HoH reports being in receipt of
this beneﬁt is 16.5 percentage points less likely to be in poverty. This raises the
issue as to whether an income-based measure such as poverty, which does not account
for care costs associated with having a particular disability appropriately measure a
pensioner’s actual standard of living (Hancock et al., 2015). Moreover, Hancock
et al. (2015) show that the prevalence of disabilities among the over 65s is concen-
trated at the lower end of the income distribution.
In addition to pension and beneﬁt income, pensioners are likely to be in receipt of
income from other sources, for example from investments made earlier in their lives.
An individual who lives in a household where the HoH reports being in receipt of (1)
private beneﬁt and miscellaneous income or (2) investment, private beneﬁt and mis-
cellaneous income relative to an individual who lives in household where the HoH
reports not being in receipt of any of these income sources is 9.17 and 10.41 percent-
age points less likely to be in poverty.
Alongside income, pensioners hold a signiﬁcant amount of their total wealth in
housing (Lowe et al., 2012). Therefore housing tenure is an important characteristic
to control for. Table 4 highlights that relative to respondents who own their house out-
right, reporting any other kind of housing tenure corresponds to a reduction in the
probability of being in initial poverty. Whilst this result might seem surprising it is
worth noting that the measure of poverty used in this paper accounts for housing
costs. Moreover, various social beneﬁts that pensioners are entitled to are means tested.
Therefore individuals in local authority housing or living in a housing association may
be in receipt of other beneﬁts (which reduce the likelihood of being in poverty), for ex-
ample 24.25% (20.32%) of individuals who reported living in local authority (a housing
association) accommodation were in receipt of incapacity beneﬁt; whereas only 8.26%
of outright homeowners reported being in receipt of this beneﬁt.40
Previous studies have found a strong correlation between health and income (see
inter-alia Stronks et al., 1997; Deaton, 1999). Table 4 shows that individuals who report
being in fair health (relative to excellent) raise their likelihood of being in poverty by 9
percentage points, holding all else constant. However individuals who report of poor
40 Understanding Society does not collect annual information on housing wealth and therefore it is not pos-
sible to control for the value of an individual’s home, moreover such data are likely to contain a lot meas-
urement error.
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health are not statistically more likely to be in poverty. This result is likely to be due to
the fact that individuals who report being in poor health are more likely to be in receipt
of a particular beneﬁt(s) such as disability beneﬁt, and Table 4 shows that this reduces
the likelihood of being in poverty. Indeed, over 35% of HoHs who report their health as
‘poor’ are in receipt of incapacity or severe disability beneﬁt, whereas only 1.16% of
HoHs who report being in excellent health report claiming these beneﬁts.
Alongside measures of self-reported health UKHLS also asks individuals whether
they have a longstanding illness or disability; a positive response increases the prob-
ability of being in initial poverty by 4.1 percentage points.41,42 In order to determine
the joint effect of self-reported health and having a limiting illness I interact these cov-
ariates, however the coefﬁcient estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Understanding Society also contains information about caring responsibilities in
the household. Speciﬁcally it asks whether an individual cares for a sick, disabled
or elderly individual in the household. A positive response leads to a reduction in
the probability of being in initial poverty by 6.8 percentage points. Again, this is likely
to be related to the fact that these individuals are likely to be in receipt of Attendance
Allowance or Carer’s Allowance which increases individual and therefore household
income, however, as already highlighted such beneﬁts do not fully account for the
signiﬁcant care costs associated with the disability (Hancock et al., 2015).
UKHLS also asks respondents to assess their contemporaneous ﬁnancial situation.
Table 4 suggests that relative to individuals who report ‘living comfortably’ and indi-
viduals who report a lower level of subjective ﬁnancial situation are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be in poverty. Indeed, this effect is monotonically increasing the lower the
level of ﬁnancial situation reported; for example an individual living in a household
where the HoH reports that they are ﬁnding it ‘very difﬁcult’ is 30 percentage points
more likely to be in poverty at t− 1 holding all else constant.
4.3 Sample retention
Table 5 shows the effect particular individual and HoH characteristics have on the
probability of attriting from the survey in period t, conditional on having been in
the survey at t− 1.
At the individual level Table 5 indicates that older individuals are more likely to
attrit from the survey holding all else constant; the marginal effect of increasing an
individual’s age from the sample median (73) to the 75th percentile increases the prob-
ability of attriting from the survey by 3.3 percentage points.
Individuals who report being married are less likely to attrit from the sample rela-
tive to single individuals; on the other hand the marginal effect of being a divorcee or
widow/widower does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the probability of attriting from
survey relative to being single.
41 A longstanding illness or disability is deﬁned as a condition that has troubled the respondent for at least
12 months.
42 It could be that such impairments may have hindered employment however the survey does not ask how
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At the HoH-level housing tenure is important in determining survey retention.
HOHs who own their own home are signiﬁcantly more likely to remain in the survey
relative to individuals who live in local authority housing or in a housing association.
This ﬁnding is consistent with attrition patterns found in other European longitudinal
household panel surveys (Watson, 2002).
Table 5 suggests that self-reported health is an important factor in attriting from the
survey. HoHs who reported being in fair or poor health were 4.9 and 10.8 percentage
points respectively more likely to attrit between t− 1 and t, relative to HoHs who
reported having excellent health holding all else constant.
Sources of income are also important in determining survey attrition. Table 5 shows
that a HoH who did not rely solely on state pension and/or pension credit as their only
source of income, that is to say individuals who reported being in receipt of one or more
private or occupational pensions were signiﬁcantly more likely to remain in the survey.
Table 5. Model estimates of survey retention status
Variable M.E. Coefﬁcient (S.E.)
Individual
Age −0.033*** −0.031 (0.006)
Male 0.003 0.019 (0.029)
Married −0.023** −0.13 (0.069)
Divorced 0.007 0.074 (0.075)
Widowed −0.003 −0.017 (0.06)
HoH
Age 0.007 0.010 (0.007)
Male −0.005 −0.03 (0.051)
Owns home with mortgage −0.015 −0.09 (0.083)
Local authority housing −0.018** −0.11 (0.053)
Housing association −0.025*** −0.15 (0.059)
Renting −0.024* −0.14 (0.08)
Cares for another in household −0.013 −0.08 (0.070)
Longstanding illness/disability −0.005 −0.03 (0.040)
Health: Very good −0.012 −0.08 (0.078)
Health: Good −0.005 −0.03 (0.078)
Health: Fair −0.0473*** −0.27 (0.08)
Health: Poor −0.105*** −0.51 (0.08)
Raised 1 query −0.036*** −0.21 (0.04)
Raised >1 query −0.029* −0.18 (0.10)
1 Employer/occupational pension 0.017** 0.13 (0.04)
>1 Employer/occupational pension 0.019** 0.14 (0.05)
Data from wave 2–3 block −0.013** −0.077 (0.034)




Notes : Base groups are degree, owns home outright, Health: excellent, North East and West of
England, Financial situation: living comfortably, State pension and/or Pension Credit.
*, **, *** indicate coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Finally, Table 5 highlights the importance of controlling for particular aspects of
the survey interview, as summarised in Section 4.3. Living in a household where
one survey query was raised leads to an increase in the probability of attriting from
the sample between period t− 1 and t by 3.7 percentage points. Raising more than
one query also raised the probability of attriting by 3.1 percentage points; however
this effect was only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
4.4 Conditional poverty status
The ﬁrst-order Markov approach followed in this study formally accounts for the pos-
sibility that individual and HoH characteristics may have a differential impact on con-
ditional poverty status. One way to test whether this is true is to test for evidence of state
dependence. Aggregate State Dependence (ASD) is the difference between poverty per-
sistence and poverty entry among individuals who were initially poor and non-poor, re-
spectively. The estimate of ASD calculated for the sample is 0.587 among all individuals
present at t− 1. This ﬁgure is in line with previous research estimating poverty dynamics
using a ﬁrst-order Markov framework applied to longitudinal household panel data;
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) estimate ASD of 0.526 based on a sample of British indi-
viduals aged between 25 and 59, Buddelmeyer and Verick (2008) estimate ASD of 0.57
based on their sample of Australian individuals aged between 25 and 55. More recently
Fusco and Islam (2012) compute an estimate of ASD of 0.65 using the Luxembourgish
component of the EU-SILC. The reason the estimate of ASD is higher in this study
relative to previous studies using longitudinal British data is due to the fact that these
studies focus on working age poverty dynamics, whereas it has been shown that pen-
sioners have higher persistent poverty rates relative to the working age population
(Jenkins and Rigg, 2001; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004; DWP, 2015).
Whilst ASD is a useful measure of the differences between poverty persistence and
poverty entry it does not account for individual heterogeneity and the fact that there
might be scarring effects from being in poverty. Genuine State Dependence (GSD) on
the other hand does account for individual (observable and unobservable) differences
which may affect poverty persistence and poverty entry; Cappellari and Jenkins
(2004) show that one test for GSD in the case of a ﬁrst-order Markov framework
is to test whether the covariates used to explain poverty entry and persistence have
an identical effect on conditional poverty status at t irrespective of initial poverty sta-
tus at t− 1 (H0 : θ1 = θ2). A test of this based on the estimation sample suggests that
H0 could not be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance (Prob . χ2 = 0.72).
This ﬁnding is in contrast to previous studies of poverty dynamics which do ﬁnd sign-
iﬁcant evidence of GSD however the focus of those studies is on working age poverty
(see inter-alia Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004; Biewen, 2009; Fusco and Islam, 2012).
The strong connection between the state and pensioner incomes is likely to mitigate
the extent of scarring effects resulting from being in poverty.
4.4.1 Covariate effects conditional on being initially poor
Table 6 shows that individuals who are divorced are signiﬁcantly more likely to persist
in poverty relative to individuals who have always been single. On the other hand, the
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Age 0.008 −0.003 (0.01) 0.003 0.006 (0.009)
Male −0.01 −0.003 (0.07) −0.006 −0.076 (0.05)
Married 0.04 0.10 (0.115) −0.01 −0.12 (0.09)
Divorced 0.09** 0.23 (0.114) 0.008 0.09 (0.09)
Widowed 0.04 0.09 (0.101) 0.005 0.05 (0.08)
HoH
Age 0.004 −0.0005(0.013) −0.023 −0.0004(0.009)
Male −0.017 0.008(0.105) −0.0028 −0.014(0.07)
Other higher degree 0.093 0.17(0.17) 0.030 *** 0.23(0.106)
A-level 0.093 0.14(0.18) 0.069 *** 0.45(0.10)
GCSE 0.15 0.26(0.19) 0.056 *** 0.368(0.10)
Other qualiﬁcation 0.127 0.22(0.18) 0.066*** 0.43(0.10)
No qualiﬁcation 0.127 0.21(0.18) 0.089*** 0.54(0.10)
Owns home with mortgage 0 0.02(0.14) −0.015 −0.13(0.11)
Local authority housing −0.175** −0.38(0.16) −0.018 −0.15(0.09)
Housing association −0.136 −0.27(0.18) −0.025** −0.25(0.10)
Renting −0.038 −0.08(0.13) −0.020** −0.22(0.11)
Health: Very good 0.061 0.13(0.12) −0.004 0.086(0.098)
Health: Good 0.049 0.05(0.11) −0.003 0.057(0.09)
Health: Fair 0.005 0.01(0.12) 0.030 0.097(0.108)
Health: Poor 0.221 −0.04(0.16) −0.016 0.06(0.12)
Longstanding illness/disability 0.035 0.097(0.064) −0.032 0.05(0.05)
Very good health and limiting
illness/disability
−0.053 −0.12(0.29) 0.096 0.572(0.27)
Good health and limiting
illness/disability
−0.093 −0.21(0.28) 0.0693 0.453(0.27)
Fair health and limiting illness/
disability
−0.09 −0.20(0.29) 0.0243 0.199(0.29)
Poor health and limiting illness/
disability
−0.291 −0.72(0.52) 0.1153 0.650(0.39)
In receipt of Incapacity/severe
disablement beneﬁt
−0.058 −0.12(0.14) −0.0177 −0.181(0.087)
In receipt of attendance or
carers allowance
−0.208 −0.48(0.18) −0.0156 −0.164(0.098)
East and West Midlands 0.013 0.031(0.08) 0.01 0.09(0.07)
London and South East 0.067* 0.16(0.09) −0.015* −0.16(0.07)
East of England −0.033 −0.08(0.11) −0.005 −0.04(0.09)
South West and Wales 0.017 0.04(0.08) −0.013 −0.12(0.07)
Scotland 0.044 0.10(0.10) 0.007 0.07(0.08)
Northern Ireland 0.011 0.029(0.12) −0.007 −0.07(0.09)
FS: ‘Doing alright’ −0.022 −0.062(0.078) 0.013* 0.103(0.06)
FS: ‘Just about getting by’ −0.04 −0.127(0.09) 0.035*** 0.26(0.071)
FS: ‘Finding it quite difﬁcult’ 0.0593 0.104(0.16) 0.057*** 0.38(0.15)
FS: ‘Finding it very difﬁcult’ −0.094 −0.28(0.23) 0.001 −0.005(0.24)
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marginal effect of living in local authority housing or a housing association reduces
the probability of persisting in poverty. This is likely to be related to (changes in)
the particular types of beneﬁt income these individuals are claiming (at particular sur-
vey waves) relative to individuals in other types of housing tenure.
Table 6 also highlights the importance of education in affecting poverty persistence,
even in retirement. Relative to individuals who lived in a household where the HoH
had a degree, lower levels of educational attainment such as ‘other or no qualiﬁcation’
increased the probability of being in poverty by 12.7 percentage points. This is also
reﬂected in Table 3, which shows that 15% of non-poor households have a HoH
with a degree, this ﬁgure stands at only 3% among poor households. There is a strong
correlation between educational attainment and career occupation, therefore changes
in the sources of income in retirement for example the number and type of pensions an
individual is in receipt of, and how this may change between t− 1 and t imply that
increases in income will (on average) be concentrated among individuals with a higher
level of educational attainment.
Table 6 highlights the importance of beneﬁt income in determining poverty status.
Individuals in receipt of caring or attendance allowance are more than 20 percentage
points less likely to persist in poverty relative to individuals who are not in receipt of
these beneﬁts. Whilst this reduces the likelihood of persisting in low income it is hard











−0.015 −0.0007(0.06) −0.002 −0.017(0.046)
>1 Employer/occupational
pension
−0.039 0.009(0.11) −0.016*** −0.22(0.08)
Investment income 0.06*** 0.152(0.06) −0.0037 −0.036(0.053)
Private beneﬁt income and
misc. income
0.015 0.042(0.25) 0.0122 0.106(0.143)
Investment, private beneﬁt and
misc. income
0.168 0.418(0.31) 0.0096 0.084(0.168)
Cares for another in household −0.003 −0.03(0.17) −0.014 −0.19(0.11)
Data from wave 2–3 block −0.0005 −0.001(0.05) −0.0191 0.07(0.04)




Notes : Base groups are degree, owns home outright, Health: excellent, North East and West of
England, Financial situation: living comfortably State pension and/or Pension Credit, No dis-
ability beneﬁts, No non-pension income sources. *, **, *** indicate coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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perspective. Finally, individuals who were in receipt of only investment income were
signiﬁcantly more likely to be in poverty relative to individuals who were not in re-
ceipt of additional (non-pension) income sources.
Table 6 indicates that relatively few characteristics were statistically signiﬁcant in
the poverty persistence equation, whereas in the equation for initial poverty status
there were many more signiﬁcant covariates. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) note
that the lack of signiﬁcant results is due to: (1) the framework accounting for the ini-
tial conditions problem; and (2) the fact that the number of individuals at risk of pov-
erty persistence is signiﬁcantly smaller than that at risk of poverty entry, as shown in
Table 1.
For individuals who are in poverty at t− 1 the model estimates imply the probabil-
ity they remain in this state (i.e., poverty persistence) is 0.69, this does not change if I
restrict the sample to individuals present at t− 1 and t. This ﬁnding is of policy rele-
vance: the results suggest that there is a high degree of state dependence in poverty
among pensioner households in the UK. However, there are no policies such as job
assistance programmes to enable these households to escape poverty in the long
run; this may be in part due to the notion that retirement in the UK is considered
a permanent exit from the labour market (Kohli, 1991). Previous studies have high-
lighted the sharp drop in labour supply when individuals approach retirement age
in Britain and the lack of partial retirement or unretirement (Blundell et al., 2002;
Banks et al., 2006; Kanabar, 2015). Existing policies such as Pension Credit (and
its predecessor the Minimum Income Guarantee) aim to supplement an individual’s
income once they are in poverty, i.e. they are largely reactive policies.
The analysis also indicates that pensioner incomes are heavily inﬂuenced by beneﬁt
income which does not necessarily lead to a ‘welfare improving outcome’ in the
context of exiting poverty, especially when one factors in additional costs associated
with care. Nonetheless, certain income supplementation programmes such as Pension
Credit have been shown to increase the net income of the poorest pensioners (Brewer
and Emmerson, 2003). Although the authors note that the complexity of the UK
beneﬁt system can mean that claiming Pension Credit affects an individual’s eligibility
for other beneﬁts, and the marginal withdrawal rate can be as high as 91%.43
4.4.2 Covariate effects conditional on being initially non-poor
Table 6 highlights that ﬁve HoH characteristics affect the probability of entering pov-
erty: education, housing tenure, subjective ﬁnancial situation, beneﬁt income and pen-
sions. We discuss each of these in turn.
The likelihood of entering poverty is signiﬁcantly higher among individuals whose
HoH has a lower level of educational attainment. An individual living in a household
where the HoH’s highest level of educational attainment is a GCSE or equivalent level
43 The general effect of Pension Credit is to reduce the effective marginal withdrawal rate see Brewer and
Emmerson (2003, 91). The authors show that the introduction of Pension Credit has an income and sub-
stitution effect and its success largely depends on how these effects vary by particular groups of pen-
sioners, and also by differences in the retirement savings behaviour among the current working
population (Clark, 2001; Brewer and Emmerson, 2003).
Poverty dynamics among older individuals in the UK 29
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474747216000135
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Essex, on 27 Oct 2016 at 13:05:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
of education, is 5.6 percentage points more likely to enter poverty relative to a HoH
with a degree. The marginal effect is even higher for HoHs who do not have a formal
qualiﬁcation (8.9 percentage points); this is concerning given that 35% of the sample
fall in to this category.
Housing tenure is another important factor in determining whether an individual
enters poverty; relative to individuals who live in a household where the HoH reports
the property is owned outright, individuals who live in a housing association or rental
accommodation are signiﬁcantly less likely to enter poverty. The marginal effects
range between 1.8 and 2.4 percentage points. As noted in Section 4.2, this ﬁnding
is related to the types of beneﬁt income individual’s living in these types of accommo-
dation are claiming relative to outright homeowners.
Table 6 highlights that an individual’s own subjective assessment of their ﬁnancial
situation is strongly correlated with poverty entry. HoH’s who report that their ﬁnan-
cial situation as ‘doing alright’, ‘just about getting by’ or ‘ﬁnding it quite difﬁcult’ are
between 1.3 and 5.7 percentage points more likely to enter poverty relative to HoHs
who report their ﬁnancial situation as ‘living comfortably’.
Table 6 also indicates that beneﬁt income and pensions are important for determin-
ing poverty entry. Individuals living in a household where the HoH received income
from two or more private or occupational pensions lowered the probability of entering
poverty by 1.6 percentage points, relative to individuals who relied on state pension
and/or pension credit alone. Finally, similar to the results found for initial poverty,
individuals living in a household where the HoH reported being in receipt of incap-
acity/severe disability or carers/attendance allowance are signiﬁcantly less likely to
enter poverty, relative to individuals who reported not being in receipt of either of
these beneﬁts.
4.5 Correlations
One advantage of using a ﬁrst-order Markov approach is to account for initial con-
ditions and non-random survey attrition. Table 7 summarises the extent of these
two issues when modelling low-income dynamics among British pensioners, and
also documents a range of tests to determine the sensitivity of the results to the
assumptions imposed by the econometric framework.
Table 7 shows strong evidence of unobserved factors which are correlated with ini-
tial and conditional poverty status. The correlation coefﬁcient ρ2 is negative and stat-
istically signiﬁcant; implying that pensioners who are initially poor are less likely to
remain poor compared to individuals who are initially non-poor (i.e., regression to-
wards the mean). When one considers that this group of individuals has relatively
ﬁxed sources of income this suggests that pensioner incomes are not as stable as
one might have ﬁrst assumed.
Table 7 indicates that there was no signiﬁcant evidence of an unobserved correl-
ation between non-random attrition and poverty status (in either period t− 1 or t)
among British pensioners.
Rows 2, 3 and 7 of Table 7 imply the sample exhibits an initial conditions problem;
whereas the test for exogeneity of non-random attrition could not be rejected.
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However, the test for joint exogoneity is strongly rejected. To summarise, Table 7
indicates that future research using an endogenous switching framework to model
pensioner poverty should use a bivariate framework. This is to control for the fact
that when modelling poverty transitions between two periods the group of individuals
who are initially observed to be in poverty are a non-random sample. More generally,
the results suggest that when modelling low-income dynamics among British pen-
sioners, irrespective of the econometric framework, one should account for individ-
ual-level unobserved heterogeneity.
4.5.1 Model identiﬁcation and sensitivity tests
The ﬁrst-order Markov approach has a number of attractive features as discussed in
Section 2.2; however, for the estimates to be unbiased requires one to have appropriate
instruments. Oneway to check the suitability of instruments is to rely on functional form
for model identiﬁcation, and include the characteristics used as instruments in equation
(3). A statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient would indicate an invalid instrument. Table 7
(row 13) highlights that paternal educational attainment is not statistically signiﬁcant
in the equation for conditional poverty status, after having controlled for it in the equa-
tion determining initial poverty status. Now consider the covariates used to control for
non-randomattrition, Table 7 shows that these playno signiﬁcant role in the conditional
poverty equation. Finally, Table 7 shows that it is possible to exclude covariates which
control for both the initial conditions and non-random attrition from the conditional
poverty equation (row 16 of Table 7).
Table 7. Model correlations and test statistics
1. Correlations between unobservable components Estimate p > |z|
2. ρ1: Initial poverty and survey retention 0.012 0.61
3. ρ2: Initial and conditional poverty −0.44 0.00
4. ρ3: Survey retention and conditional poverty −0.03 0.91
Test of correlations
7. ρ1 = ρ2 = 0: No evidence of initial conditions (χ22) 14.50 0.00
8. ρ1 = ρ3 = 0: No evidence of non-random attrition (χ22) 0.27 0.87
9. ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3: Joint exogeneity (χ23) 15.45 0.00
Test of instruments χ2d.o.f p > χ
2
12. Inclusion of paternal education in initial poverty equation 7.60 0.00
13. Inclusion of survey queries in retention equation 22.88 0.00
14. Exclusion of paternal education in transition equation 3.83 0.147
15. Exclusion of survey queries in transition equation 4.69 0.3211
16. Exclusion of paternal education & survey queries in transition
equation
8.50 0.2039
Test of normality of residuals p (Skewness) p (Kurtosis)
19. Initial poverty equation (εi,t−1) 0.00 0.00
20. Retention equation (κi,t) 0.00 0.00
21. Transition equation (ϑi,t) 0.00 0.00
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An alternative test for determining whether paternal educational attainment is a
plausible instrument to control for the initial conditions problem is to determine
whether there exists a correlation between equivalised household permanent income
and paternal educational attainment. Separately one also needs to test for a correl-
ation between the variance of equivalised household income (i.e., transitory income)
and paternal educational attainment. Permanent income is the sum of real monthly
equivalised household expenditure on: accommodation (rent and council tax or mort-
gage and council tax), food (bought at a supermarket) and energy (oil, gas, electricity
and other fuel). The rational behind these tests is as follows: the modelling strategy
described in Section 4.3 implies that paternal educational attainment is correlated
with permanent income; however, conditional on this is uncorrelated with transitory
income. One way to test this assumption is to (separately) regress permanent income
and the variance of household income on paternal educational attainment. If paternal
education satisﬁes the conditions for being a suitable instrument, then it should be
correlated with permanent income and uncorrelated with transitory income.
Appendix B contains the results from two such regressions based on the sample
data used in this study; the results indicate there is a strong statistical correlation be-
tween permanent income and paternal educational attainment and no statistical cor-
relation between the variance of household income (transitory income) and paternal
educational attainment. In order for the latter regression to be valid there should
be no evidence of non-random attrition (in order to estimate the variance of equiva-
lised household net income one must observe household income in both survey
waves), this is the case for the sample used in this study as shown in Table 7.
One necessary assumption is joint normality of the errors in equations (1)–(3) for
tractability purposes; however, it is worth testing whether such an assumption
holds for the sample. Table 7 reports that tests based on skewness and kurtosis,
these tests reject the null hypothesis that the sample moments satisfy the normality
assumption. An alternative test is to graphically determine the extent of non-normal-
ity. Appendix C contains quantile plots of the residuals from 1–3 versus the quantiles
of a Gaussian distribution; these plots also indicate that the joint normality assump-
tion is unlikely to hold. It is important to note these shortcomings when interpreting
the results; however as Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) show in their study it is also
worth noting that the model is able to accurately predict transition probabilities of
sample respondents, for example the model predicts the average probability of pov-
erty entry (persistence) among respondents present at t− 1 and t is 0.0958 (0.6848)
the corresponding ﬁgure based on raw sample transitions is 0.0949 (0.6844).
In order to determine the sensitivity of the results reported in Section 5; two alter-
native versions of the model were estimated. In these respective speciﬁcations, an in-
dividual is deﬁned as being in poverty if their equivalised net real household income is
below 50% and 70% of the population median income. In both cases there is a correl-
ation between initial and conditional poverty; namely mean reversion. Similar to
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) the estimates imply estimated poverty persistence
and entry rates rise, the higher the poverty threshold. To summarise, the vast majority
of robustness tests suggest that the assumptions underlying the model are satisﬁed.
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5 Model implications
5.1 Changes in income
The model correlations show that ρ2 is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which im-
plies there is a strong negative correlation between unobserved factors determining
initial poverty and conditional poverty status, put another way there is regression to-
wards the mean.44 Graphically, this is equivalent to a negative correlation between the
level of income at t− 1 and the change in income between t− 1 and t.45 Figure 3
shows this relationship based on the sample data used in this study.
Figure 3 is consistent with the sign of ρ2 reported in Table 7; highlighting that
income in retirement is not as stable as one might have initially assumed and also
demonstrating the drawback of using a simple dichotomous measure such as ‘poverty
status’ to group together clearly different households.
Whilst Figure 3 graphically assessed the change in equivalised income between t− 1
and t and the income level at t− 1 it does this across all households, in Figures 4 and 5
I show the extent of the changes in net equivalised income using boxplots, depicting
the change in income between t− 1 and t conditional on poverty status at t− 1.
Figure 3. (colour online) Level of income in t− 1 versus change in
income between t− 1 and t.
Notes : Income refers to monthly household net equivalised income which
has been adjusted to account for inﬂation (2005 prices).
44 In Section 5.1 I analyse changes in income with respect to the balanced panel; survey attrition implies
that we do not observe household income at period t for all households. However, the results in
Section 4 indicate that there is no evidence of non-random attrition for the sample used in this study
and therefore analysing the sample in this way is feasible.
45 This was ﬁrst shown in the context of UK wage dynamics by Stewart and Swafﬁeld (1999).
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The median (mean) change in monthly net household income among initially poor
households between t− 1 and t is £48.20 (£210.89). On the other hand, the same stat-
istic for non-poor households is −£4.47 (−£87.38). These statistics and Figures 4 and
5 show that there are signiﬁcant variations in household income changes between t−
1 and t particularly among non-poor households at t− 1.
Whilst Figures 3–5 serve as a useful benchmark to analyse equivalised household-
level changes in income between t− 1 and t, what is arguably more interesting, given
that the aim is to understand income dynamics is to determine which subcomponents
of individual income are driving such changes. Understanding Society contains infor-
mation on the components of individual’s income, which in turn (either solely or
jointly) make up household income. In order to understand the results driving the dy-
namics implied by the model and Figures 3–5, Table 8 describes the mean changes in
income components (restricted to individuals who reported being in receipt of a par-
ticular income source at t− 1) between t− 1 and t and by initial poverty status.
Table 8 shows that conditional on initial poverty status there are clear differences in
the average change in the subcomponents of individual income. This is consistent with
the correlation estimate of ρ2 reported in Table 7 and Figures 3–5. Table 8 also shows
that certain components of an individual’s income change more than others and hence
will have a more profound effect on household income; for example investment, pen-
sion and social beneﬁt income are particularly important in increasing individual (and
thus household) income among initially poor individuals; whereas it declines for indi-
viduals who are initially non-poor.46 Table 8 also shows the particularly strong impact
social beneﬁt income (in particular carer’s allowance, disability living allowance and
Figure 4. (colour online) Boxplot of change in income between 2010/11
and 2011/12 among initially poor individuals.
Notes : Income refers to monthly household net equivalised income which
has been adjusted to account for inﬂation (2005 prices).
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incapacity beneﬁt income) has on determining an individual’s poverty status; the mag-
nitude of the changes observed in social beneﬁt income is similar to that observed for
pension income between t− 1 and t. An alternative way to highlight the importance
of social beneﬁt income in determining an individual’s income position is to consider
the average change in income (by initial poverty status) among individuals who at t−
1 reported not being in receipt of social beneﬁt income, but by t did report being in
receipt of some form of social beneﬁt income: the average change in social beneﬁt in-
come was £440.43 among individuals who exited poverty between t− 1 and t, more-
over no individuals in the sample entered poverty between t− 1 and t and also
reported an increase (from zero) in their social beneﬁt income.
Table 8 also highlights the importance of labour income; however this is only rele-
vant to a very small proportion of the sample. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) ﬁnd evi-
dence of a regression towards the mean based on BHPS data of working age
households; however for working age individuals signiﬁcant changes in their individ-
ual (and hence household) income is possible through the labour market for example
gaining employment. In the case of retired individuals a transition back into paid em-
ployment in known as ‘unretirement’ and whilst it prevalence varies signiﬁcantly be-
tween countries, unretirement studies have consistently shown a return to work
provides a non-trivial source of income in retirement (Maestas, 2010; Kanabar,
2015). In this study, very few individuals (<1% sample) transition from retirement
Figure 5. (colour online) Boxplot of change in income between 2010/11
and 2011/12 among initially non-poor individuals.
Notes: Income refers to monthly household net equivalised income which
has been adjusted to account for inﬂation (2005 prices).
46 Investment and pension income are made up of various income streams including private pension in-
come, rental income, annuity income and individual’s/spouse’s employer pension income.
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back into paid employment or self-employment; however among individuals who do
unretire and were initially poor, the average change in household income between t− 1
and t is £768 (2005 prices) and 80% of these individuals exit poverty.
5.2 Stylised examples
Table 9 assesses the importance of individual and household-level characteristics on
poverty entry, persistence and duration by comparing individuals from different
types of pensioner households.47
The reference male pensioner (case 1) is aged 74 (the median age of HoHs at t− 1),
lives in a household whose HoH is in good health, owns their home outright, is edu-
cated to GCSE level, is single (never married), has income from one occupational or
employer pension, has no other sources of income, does not receive any disability ben-
eﬁts and reports their ﬁnancial situation as ‘quite difﬁcult’. The predicted probability
of this male persisting in poverty is 0.53 and the probability he enters poverty is 0.137.
For this man the unconditional probability of him entering poverty is 0.227 and the
mean and median duration of his poverty spell length is 2.13 and 1.09 years, respect-
ively, whilst the mean and median duration between poverty spells is 7.24 and 4.67
years. As Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) note the fact that median spell lengths are
smaller than mean spell lengths is due to the fact that spell-lengths are skewed; typic-
ally one would expect many short spells and fewer longer spells. Nonetheless, the
results indicate that there is signiﬁcant individual heterogeneity even for individuals
with identical characteristics underlined by the differences between the mean and me-
dian spell-lengths (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004, 12).
Case 2 is identical to case 1 except the male pensioner reports having a limiting ill-
ness and is in receipt of incapacity/severe disability beneﬁt. For this individual the pre-
dicted persistence and entry rate into poverty is lower: 0.33 and 0.09, respectively. The
spell-length before this male pensioner relapses back into poverty is longer than in
case 1. The unconditional probability of being poor is slightly lower at 0.12. This is
Table 8. Changes in components of income between t− 1 and t
Component of income Poort− 1 (£) σpoor Non-poort− 1 (£) σnon-poor
All labour income −29.74 131.47 −87.90 150.09
Miscellaneous −27.29 136.0 −106.89 2,291.1
Private beneﬁt −59.39 93.31 −52.60 110.02
Investment 29.13 383.3 −18.42 2,016.26
Pension 64.66 620.71 −163.55 4,485.03
Social beneﬁts 59.87 180.92 −13.09 367.11
Notes : Income components are at the individual level and quoted in January 2010 prices.
Sample restricted to individuals who report being receipt of income component at t− 1.
47 These estimates are generated using the point estimates in Tables 3–5 and expressions in appendix
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Case 1: Aged 74, HoH is in good health, owns their
home outright, educated to GCSE level, is single
(never married), income from one occupational
or employer pension, no other sources of income,
does not receive any disability beneﬁts and
reports their ﬁnancial situation as ‘quite difﬁcult’
0.53 0.13 0.46 0.22 (2.12,1.09) (7.24,4.66)
Case 2: Case 1 except the man reports having a
limiting illness and is in receipt of incapacity/
severe disability beneﬁt
0.33 0.09 0.66 0.12 (1.50,0.63) (11,7.27)
Case 3: Case 2 except the man has no occupational
pension and relies on state pension (and pension
credit) income alone
0.42 0.10 0.57 0.15 (1.74,.814) (9.76,6.41)
Case 4: Case 1 except the man ﬁnds has a limiting
illness but does not receive any kind of disability
beneﬁt income
0.81 0.06 0.18 0.24 (5.28,3.30) (15.96,10.71)
Case 5: female, widowed, aged 74, HoH reports
being in good health, HOH has a limiting illness/
disability, does not receive any disability beneﬁts,
has one occupational/employer pension, owns
their home outright, is educated to GCSE
standard and reports their ﬁnancial situation as
‘very difﬁcult’
0.59 0.04 0.40 0.10 (2.45,1.32) (21.41,14.49)
Case 6: Case 5 except the female reports being in
receipt of investment income
0.66 0.04 0.33 0.11 (2.96,1.68) (22.62,15.33)
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consistent with the estimation results, which found that particular forms of beneﬁt in-
come actually reduce the likelihood of being in poverty but does not reﬂect an increase
in an individual’s actual standard of living.
Case 3 is identical to case 2 except the male pensioner has no occupational pension
and relies on state pension (and pension credit) alone. The effect of these two factors
raises the probability of poverty entry and probability persistence to 0.42 and 0.10,
respectively. Similarly the unconditional poverty rate is higher (0.15) than in case
2. The mean and median spell-length of poverty is also larger than in case 2 at
1.75 and 0.819 years, respectively. Intuitively, the spell-length between each poverty
period is lower (9.84 and 6.47 years at the mean and median, respectively).
Case 4 is identical to case 1 except the male pensioner has a limiting illness but does
not receive any kind of disability beneﬁt income. Relative to case 1 this leads to a sign-
iﬁcant increase in the persistence and the unconditional probability of entering pov-
erty (0.81 and 0.24, respectively); it also increases the mean and median period
spent in poverty (5.28, 3.30 years) relative to case 1.
Cases 5 and 6 consider the situation when the individual is a female pensioner. The
reference female pensioner is a widow, aged 74, lives in a household where the HoH
reports being in good health although does have a limiting illness/disability, does not
receive any disability beneﬁts, has one occupational/employer pension, owns their
home outright, is educated to GCSE level and reports her ﬁnancial situation as
‘very difﬁcult’. This predicted probability of this female pensioner entering poverty
is 0.04, whilst the predicted persistence rate is 0.59. The unconditional poverty rate
is 0.10 and the median (mean) poverty spell-length is 2.45 (1.32) years, whilst the me-
dian (mean) period between poverty spells is 14.63 (21.61) years.
Case 6 is identical to case 5 except the female reports being in receipt of investment
income. The poverty entry rate for this female is 0.04 and the probability of persisting in
poverty is 0.66. In case 6, the length of time between periods of poverty is slightly larger
than in case 5, the median (mean) duration between is 15.33 (22.62) years; however the
mean and median poverty spell-length is itself slightly longer (2.96, 1.68 years).
Cases 1–6 highlight the importance of particular individual and household-level
characteristics such as the presence of disability beneﬁts, an occupational pension, in-
vestment income, housing tenure and contemporaneous subjective ﬁnancial position
in determining the probability that a pensioner will enter, persist or relapse into pov-
erty. Table 9 also highlights that duration estimates based on a ﬁrst-order Markov
framework (assuming steady-state values) are highly sensitive to changes in the pov-
erty persistence and entry rate. The results also support the ﬁndings in Bardasi et al.
(2002) and the DWP low-income dynamics publication that pensioners on low
incomes or with characteristics associated with being in a low-income household
have a relatively high poverty persistence rate. A recent report by the DWP which
investigated non-take up of Pension Credit found a major factor cited by individuals
was that they felt ‘bad for asking for help from the government’ (Radford et al., 2012,
18). Therefore resources should be focused on trying to change such attitudes; for ex-
ample through consultation groups and targeted information campaigns.
Finally, Table 9 also indicates that there is heterogeneity in both predicted poverty
persistence and poverty entry rates. These ﬁndings suggest that predicted state
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probabilities of being poor are related to both periods spent out of poverty and also in
poverty.48 This necessitates the need for anti-poverty policies which reduce the extent
to which individual relapse back into poverty and also programmes such as Pension
Credit which increase individual incomes which fall below a particular ‘low-income’
threshold. Active labour market policies are often cited as being an effective in com-
bating poverty (Martin, 1998); however, such programmes are often aimed at working
age individuals in the UK, in the case of pensioners this unlikely to be a feasible and
effective solution partly also due to cultural factors associated with retirement in the
UK (Kohli, 1991). Therefore policies should be aimed at trying to reduce contempor-
ary pensioner poverty through alternative measures, perhaps by some kind of hybrid
intervention which would be more akin to a paid/in kind beneﬁt associated with vol-
untary or paid work in order reduce the stigma or social perception associated with
returning to work post retirement.
6 Conclusion
Similar to many advanced economies the UK population has a signiﬁcant proportion
of older people: as of 2014 it was estimated that 11.4 million individuals or 17.7% of
the population are aged 65 and over (ONS, 2015). Therefore it is important to under-
stand the income changes experienced by the poorest members of this group of indi-
viduals and the implications this has for policy. This study has provided the ﬁrst
estimates of poverty dynamics of pensioner households which are robust to selection
biases which arise due to initial conditions and non-random sample attrition.
The econometric framework followed in this paper has shown that there exist un-
observed factors, which determine initial and conditional poverty status. The sign
of this correlation is negative indicating regression towards the mean. From a meth-
odological perspective this implies evidence of an initial conditions problem, studies
which analyse income dynamics among pensioner households and ignore this issue
will get bias results. It also highlights that contrary to what one might assume pen-
sioner incomes do exhibit a degree of volatility and are not completely stable, this
is noteworthy given the limited number of income sources available to this group
of individuals. Finally the results indicate no evidence of a correlation between low
income and non-random attrition.
Pensioners exhibit a high degree of poverty persistence; therefore it is important to
understand which components of income are driving the ﬁnding of mean reversion.
The results indicate that social beneﬁt, investment and pension income increased be-
tween t− 1 and t for initially poor individuals, whilst the opposite is true for the non-
poor and moreover the variance of changes in these income components is large. This
underlines the extent of individual-level heterogeneity among initially ‘poor pen-
sioners’ and the importance for controlling for unobserved characteristics. This is
also supported by the ﬁnding that there is a large degree of variation in poverty per-
sistence rates even for individuals with the same characteristics. It suggests that there
48 Additional analyses of stylised cases were estimated for better-off individuals; in these cases there was
variation in both poverty entry and persistence rates albeit the predicted entry rates are very low.
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is a degree of variation in household income at older ages, which is interesting given
few pensioners return to the labour market post retirement, however it is important to
note that the labour market is likely to be an important factor in explaining the het-
erogeneity in retirement income predominantly through lifetime labour supply, earn-
ings and pension contributions.
One ﬁnding which is particularly important is the association between an indi-
vidual’s standard of living and the beneﬁt income they are in receipt of. The ana-
lysis shows that disability/incapacity beneﬁt income and carers or attendance
allowance play an important role in determining both initial and conditional pov-
erty status. However being in receipt of such beneﬁts does not to imply an individ-
ual is somehow ‘better off’, or alternatively correspond to a higher standard of
living. This highlights that other measures of deprivation other than those based
solely on income such as material deprivation are important in order to determine
pensioner living standards.
The ﬁndings indicate speciﬁc factors play a role in determining initial and condi-
tional poverty status: educational attainment (HoH and paternal), social beneﬁt in-
come, housing tenure, health, caring, having a limiting illness and the presence of
an occupational or private pension. Policies which emphasise the role of retraining
in order to reduce re-entry into poverty or unemployment such as Employment
Support Allowance tend to be directed at working-age cohorts, partly due to the
fact that retirement in the UK is largely seen as permanent withdrawal from the la-
bour market (Banks and Smith, 2006). Current policies aimed at existing pensioners
who are living in poverty only boost retirement income, but do not actually tackle the
root causes which have led an individual to be poverty in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, as
retirement income is to a large extent a function of lifetime labour supply and earnings
(and hence deferred income) any potential policy which attempted to do so would
need to be carefully devised and cost effective. Moreover, previous research has high-
lighted the strong disincentives Pension Credit can generate (in terms of high marginal
tax rates) should a poor pensioner wish to return to work (Clark, 2001; Brewer and
Emmerson, 2003). A report based on representative British data estimated 1.2 million
pensioners in 2008/2009 had no income sources other than state pension and beneﬁt
income (Palmer, 2010). Therefore, whilst policymakers have introduced a raft of pol-
icies including auto enrolment and increasing the age at which individuals are eligible
to claim their state pension, these target current working age individuals in order to
reduce pensioner poverty among future pensioner cohorts and does not resolve the
issue of reducing contemporaneous pensioner poverty. The results from this study
highlight some of the methodological factors which should be accounted for when try-
ing to improve our understanding of pensioner income dynamics.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Poverty durations
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) show in the case of the model structure imposed by (1)–






Median non-poverty log(0.5)/log(1− li)
Unconditional poverty ei/(ei + 1− si)
Notes: Where mi, li and ei refer to corresponding steady-state values of mi,t, li,t and ei,t,
respectively.
Appendix B: Testing instrument validity
Permanent income and paternal educational attainment.
A statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate implies paternal educational attain-
ment is a suitable instrument.
Table B1. Estimation results: instrument validity I
Variable Coefﬁcients are different (S.E.)





Variance of income and paternal educational attainment.
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Appendix C: Quantile plots of equation residuals versus a Gaussian distributed random
variable
Table B2. Estimation results: instrument validity II
Variable Coefﬁcient (S.E.)





Appendix C. (colour online) (a) Initial poverty equation. (b) Retention equation.
(c) Transition equation.
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